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Abstract 
This Research aims to compare the earnings management which is big bath accounting model while 
CEO Changes in Indonesia. This research is using Secondary data which is Financial Statement from 
the Indonesian Stock Exchange. CEO change is classified either as routine or non-routine based on 
RUPS (General Shareholders Meeting) and RUPSLB (Extraordinary General Shareholders Meeting) 
information. 
The purposive sampling was used in this research by sampling 14 listed company of CEO Change 
non-routine and 34 listed company of CEO Change routine. These samples are observed from 2004 to 
2014. To identify the big bath accounting practice. Although CEO Change non-routine made a high 
correlation in this study, the study provides there is no difference in earnings management big bath 
accounting model while CEO Changes between routine and non-routine changes. 
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1. Introduction 
Earnings information as part of the financial statements is frequently targeted to be managed by 
management. Such actions can be done by selecting specific accounting policies that supporting the 
company’s profit following the wishes of management. Various tactics of earnings management 
according to Scott (2000) and Siregar and Utama (2008), these are the big bath, income minimization, 
income maximization, and income smoothing. Among these patterns, big bath and income smoothing is 
a behavior accounting that deserves to be noticed. 
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Sometimes managers applying accounting policies by lowering revenue. It is called the big bath. Bath 
or also called big bath, and this may occur during of the organizational pressure at the turn of the new 
management is to acknowledge failure or deficit because the old management and new management 
wanted to avoid such failures. This technique can also recognize the costs in future periods and the loss 
of the current period when the potential loss cannot be avoided in the current period. Consequently, the 
management undertakes “big bath” by charging the cost estimates later and do clear the desks. As a 
result, the next period earnings will be higher than it should be. 
Many empirical studies have documented the big bath done by managers (Walsh et al., 1991; Beattie et 
al., 1994; Hwang & Ryan, 2000; Christensen et al., 2008; Riedl & Srinivasan, 2010). However, the one 
of interesting empirical research found that the big bath behavior is observed with the arrival of a new 
CEO, examples Pourciau (1993) and Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) that resulted is CEO turnover 
will affect the CEO motivation to manipulate earnings reports. 
The phenomenon of management changes can be divided into routine and non-routine. Routine means 
that management changes performed regularly or periodically until the term ends. Non-routine 
management changes are sporadic or are dismissed before the term ends. In the management turnover 
rival, the new management appointed will perform a big bath in the first year because of the potential 
losses, the reputation of which is owned by the new management will not bear the debt to shift the 
responsibility on a compensation system that occurs at that time or others (Obinata, 2007; Tokuga & 
Yamashita, 2011). On the other hand, in the case of routine management changes, big bath may occur 
when (during the year) the resignation of the management such as the manager who resigned have the 
authority to propose the name of the manager for a period of the next year (Otomasa, 1997; Yamaguchi, 
2009), the possibility exists that the manager who resigned will do big bath to allow his successor to 
make a fresh start in his first year in office. Based on these explanations, the formulation of the 
research questions are as follows: (1) Is the period before the routine change of management, the old 
management practice significant bath accounting? (2) Is the period before the non-routine change of 
management, old management practice big bath accounting? (3) Is the period after the routine change 
of management, new management practice big bath accounting? (4) Is the period after the non-routine 
change of management, new management practice big bath accounting? 
 
2. Literature and Hypotheses 
2.1 Agency Theory 
The agency theory describes that the agency relationship arises when one or more persons (the 
principal) employs another person (the agent) to provide a service and then delegate decision-making 
authority to the agent. The relationship between the principal and the agent can lead to imbalance 
condition information (asymmetrical information) for the agent in a position to have more information 
about the company than the principal. Assuming that individuals act to maximize their self-interest, 
then the information asymmetry that has will encourage agents to hide some information. In the 
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conditions of asymmetry information, the agent can influence the accounting numbers presented in the 
financial statements caused by earnings management practice. This information asymmetry led to the 
possibility of conflict between the principal and the agent (Nugroho et al., 2018). 
Regarding Healy and Wahlen (1999) and Leuz et al. (2003), the motivation of earnings management is 
as followed: “One study found that earning management occurs for a variety of reasons, including 
influencing the stock market, increasing management compensation, reducing the likelihood of 
violating lending agreements, and avoiding intervention by government regulators”. The first and the 
second motivation relates to agency theory which states opportunistic behavior of the agent (manager) 
that leads to information asymmetry between managers and investors. This information asymmetry 
revealed managers in communicating misleading information to investors and other users of financial 
statements (as lender) to achieve their own goals (Utami & Nugroho, 2017; Soekapdjo et al., 2018).  
2.2 Earnings Management 
Earnings management is intervening management in the process of preparation of financial statements 
for external companies to achieve a certain level of income with the aim to benefit himself or his own 
business (Schipper, 1989; Kothari, 2001). According to Scott (2000) and Ahmed and Duellman (2007), 
“Earnings management is the choice by a manager of accounting policies, or actions affecting earnings, 
to achieve some specific reported earnings objective”. 
The reason and purpose of a manager involved in earnings management practice are followed 
Managers may attempt to manage earnings because they believe reported earning influences investor 
and creditor decisions (Schroeder, 2011). In most cases, earnings management techniques are designed 
to improve reported income effects and to lower the company’s cost of capital. On the other hand, in a 
move to increase future profits, management may take the opportunity to report more bad news in 
periods when performance is low. 
According to Scott (2000) and Cheng and Warfield (2005) some of the motivations that drive the 
management do earnings management are as follows: Motivation bonuses; Motivation contract; The 
political motivation; Motivation taxes; Change of CEO (Chief Executive Officer); Initial Public Offer 
(IPO) and; Motivation capital markets. 
Regarding Baldwin et al. (2007), the strategies used in managing earnings: (1) Managers were 
increasing current period income to make the company better seen; (2) The manager did a big bath 
through a reduction in profit of this period. Selected periods usually a period with poor performance 
(often at times of recession where another company also reported earnings that bad) or current events 
going on an unusual occurrence such as change of management, mergers or restructuring; (3) Income 
smoothing is a common form of earnings management. In this strategy, manager increase or decrease 
in reported earnings to reduce the fluctuation. Smoothing earnings also include not report the share of 
profit in the period either by creating a backup or “bank” profits and then report this income when a 
bad period. 
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2.3 Big Bath Accounting 
In 1998, Arthur Levitt, an SEC official, said one of the earnings management techniques that could 
threaten the integrity of the financial statements is Taking a bath. The one-time overstatement of 
restructuring charges to reduce assets, which reduces future expenses. The expectation is that the 
one-time loss is discounted in the marketplace by analyst and investors who will focus on future 
earnings (Schroeder, 2011). 
“Big bath accounting profit large as reducing write-offs or income-decreasing discretionary accruals in 
income statements especially when a new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is appointed, so new CEO 
Cleans the accounts to be able to use it in the future to smooth earnings” (Stolowy & Breton, 2004). 
One type of strategy in earnings management according to Subramanyam and Wild (2009) and Bhandari 
and Iyer (2013), Big Bath conducted through the removal (Write-Off) as much as possible in one period. 
The selected period is usually a period of poor performance (often at times of recession where another 
company also reported earnings that bad) or upon a change of management, merger or restructuring.  
2.4 CEO Changes 
Chief Executive Officer (Top Executive Officers) is the top level of a company whose determine the 
direction of the company. The term CEO himself is a word derived from English as an international 
standard. However, in Indonesia, this may designation CEO is unusual sound, the reason is that in 
Indonesia, their designation is President Director. CEO in Indonesia, better known as the director or 
board of directors. Director is a general mention of the leader of a company in a Limited Liability 
Company (PT). In Indonesia, the rule of the director (CEO) contained in Constitution of the Company 
Number 40 in the Year 2007 Chapter VII regulates the functions, powers, and responsibilities of 
directors. 
Member of the Board of Directors appointed by the RUPS (General Shareholders Meeting). The articles 
of association set up procedures for the appointment, replacement, and dismissal of members of the 
Board of Directors and may also regulate the procedures for the nomination of members of the Board of 
Directors. RUPS (General Shareholders Meeting) decisions regarding the appointment, replacement, 
and dismissal of members of the Board of Directors also set the time capable for the appointment, 
replacement, and the dismissal. In the case of RUPS (General Shareholders Meeting) does not explicitly 
states the time of usage of the appointment, replacement, and dismissal of members of the Board of 
Directors, it will be useful as the closing of the RUPS (General Shareholders Meeting). 
2.5 CEO Change Routine 
CEO change routine is the CEO changeover process is performed regularly and planned. CEOs will be 
replaced when his term has expired or resigning before his term expires for reasons of illness or death. 
Old CEO who finished his tenure will usually serve as a member of the Board of Commissioners while 
the new CEO usually recruited from within the company itself so automatically the old and new CEO 
already know each other. Routine CEO turnover data is usually obtained from the decision of the RUPST 
(General Shareholders Meeting Annually). 
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2.6 CEO Change Non-Routine 
CEO change non-routine is the CEO changeover process conducted irregularly and suddenly impressed. 
CEO will be replaced even though his term has not expired and is not promoted by the company. Several 
possibilities, for example, old CEO cause this change had a poor performance and or conduct earnings 
management. Old CEO who dismissed will be out of the company and will not be served as a member of 
the Board of Commissioners, while the new CEO usually recruited from outside of the company. 
Non-routine Data CEO turnover is usually obtained from the decision of the RUPSLB (Extraordinary 
General Shareholders Meeting). Although in the decision of the RUPS or RUPSLB never mentioned 
reasons dishonorable discharge, researchers must be able to assume that if dismissed before his term ends, 
not promoted and was not given a new position in the internal company there must be something that is 
not good, or there has been hostility. 
2.7 Hypothesis 
In turn, hostile management, the new management appointed will perform big bath in the first year 
because of the hope that is despite record substantial losses, the reputation of which is owned by the 
management will not bear the debt to shift responsibility (Obinata, 2007). Then Pourciau (1993), which 
examines the level of earnings management when a change of executive non-routine found evidence that 
the new executive implements policies to lower revenue in the first year to increase revenue better in the 
next year. Regarding Jones (1991) and Dechow and Dichev (2002), an indication of earnings 
management is done by the new CEO with the type of earnings management that is done is a decrease in 
profit. Furthermore, related to Xie et al. (2003) and Peasnell et al. (2005), the new CEO served to earn 
management using discretionary accruals to lower earnings in turn. 
In the case of management changes as well (routine), the big bath may occur when (during) the 
resignation of the old management as certain conditions such as the manager who resigned have the 
authority to propose the name of the manager for the next year (Otomasa, 1997). The possibility exists 
that managers who resign will do a big bath to allow his successor to make a fresh start in its first year and 
the new management will not conduct earnings management (Weisbach, 1995).  
 
 
Figure 1. Description of Event Study Period after the Change of Non-Routine CEO 
 
Hypothesis 1 states in the period after a change of management because of the hostility (non-routine) new 
management practices big bath accounting. Furthermore, the decision of taking action of the big bath 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ijafs        International Journal of Accounting and Finance Studies           Vol. 1, No. 2, 2018 
207 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
because in the first year of management want to show the performance at the beginning look bad so that 
impact on performance in the next years will look better. In Figure 1. Notated t2, earnings management is 
used to reduce reported earnings. Through hypothesis testing are expected in the years after the CEO 
Change non-routine occurs of earnings management that is used to lower profits. 
 
 
Figure 2. Description of Event Study Period before the Change of Routine CEO 
 
Hypothesis 2 states the period before the change of management routine that the old management 
practice big bath accounting because of the change is done amicably so that management hopes that his 
successor can begin the next performance look better. In Figure 2, the year before his term ends notated 
t1. Through routine testing of CEO turnover table, t1 expected their profits to decline.  
 
 
Figure 3. Description of Event Study Period after CEO Turnover Routine 
 
Hypothesis 3 states that in the period after a change of management amicably (routine) new management 
does not practice big bath accounting that reflects on Figure 3. Therefore, hypothesis 3 provide proof that 
the CEO turnover amicably so that the new management would not do earnings management (big bath) 
to disfigure the previous management so that the third hypothesis testing is expected in the period after a 
change of routine will not be detected earnings management. 
 
 
Figure 4. Description of Event Study Period before the Change of CEO Non-Routine 
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Hypothesis 4 states that in the period before the hostile management changes (non-routine), the previous 
management did not practice big bath accounting that reflects on Figure 4. Therefore, hypothesis 4 want 
to provide proof of the cause of CEO turnover non-routine, whether because of poor performance or 
caused by another factor so that the hypothetical test 4, if the CEO is replaced because of poor 
performance or caused by another factor, it is expected that in the period before non-routine change of 
CEO will not be detected earnings management. 
 
3. Research Design and Methods 
This type of research used in this study is a comparative descriptive, which aims to explain or describe 
the phenomenon of the occurrence of an event (event study) that CEO turnover. This study uses 
secondary data from the manufacturing company’s financial statements are available on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange. 
The population in this study are all manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) 
from 2004 to 2014. The sampling technique is purposive sampling with the aim to obtain representative 
samples by the specified criteria. The criteria used to select the sample is as follows:  
 Companies that do a CEO turnover at the Indonesian Stock Exchange (BEI) in the year 2004 to 
2014. 
 The company has a complete data related to total assets, cash, part of long-term debt maturing 
within one year, depreciation expense, current assets, fixed assets (property, plant, equipment), 
current liabilities, receivables, sales, and net income. 
3.1 Variable Manipulation Accrual 
Accrual basis is the basis used by the accounting to measure the performance of companies in the form of 
profit. One of the models that are used to detect the earnings management in the accounting literature is 
the total ratio accrual of sales (Dechow et al., 1995; Leuz et al., 2003). The reason for using the accrual 
of working capital is more appropriate as Peasnell et al. (2005) has reviewed that the error residuals did 
not estimate discretionary accrual because the technique is considered to be relatively complex, and 
therefore it is used ratio accrual of working capital to sales. The reason sales as working capital accruals 
deflator is due to earnings management occur in many sales accounts as revealed by Nelson et al. (2002). 
The steps in calculating working capital accruals are as follows: 
1) Calculating Total Accrual = Δ Current Assets - Δ Debt Current - Δ Cash + Δ section Long 
Term Debt maturing within one year - Depreciation. 
2) Earnings Management is the value of total accruals divided by Sales 
 
Information: 
ΔAL = Change Current Assets 
TA = ΔAL – ΔHL – ΔKas + ΔHJPL – DEP 
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ΔHL = Change Current Debt 
ΔKas = Changes in cash and cash equivalents 
ΔHJPL = Change Long term debt presented in current liabilities 
DEP = Depreciation 
 
Information: 
TA = Total Accrual 
REV = Sales 
3.2 Methods of Analysis and Testing Hypotheses 
This research used quantitative descriptive analysis with the aim to describe the phenomenon of earnings 
management around the turn of the CEO. The author uses a variable earnings management models to 
compare earnings management practices before and after the turnover of the CEO of both routine and 
non-routine. 
3.3 Hypothesis Testing Different Test 
After determining the sample, counting the total accruals and earnings management, the next step is to 
test the hypothesis by using Paired Sample t-Test. Hypothesis 1 is stated be supported if the results of the 
t count for the model in the period t2 in routine CEO turnover greater than t table and significant. 
Hypothesis 2 is stated be supported if the results of the t count for the model in the period t1 non-routine 
CEO turnover greater than t table and significant. Hypothesis 3 is stated be supported if the results of the 
t count for the model in the period t2 non-routine CEO turnover greater than t table and significant. 
Hypothesis 4 is stated be supported if the results of the t count for the model in the period t1 non-routine 
CEO turnover greater than t table and significant. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
The authors calculated the value of TA in one year before the change of the CEO (TA t-1) and one year 
after CEO change (TA t+1) either the change of routine and non-routine using the Microsoft Excel 
program. Then, to test the hypothesis using IBM SPSS Statistics 20. The focus of this research is the 
accrual ratio of working capital to sales for representing earnings management because a lot of earnings 
management occurs on account of sales. 
In general, accrual, which are accounting products, can be considered to have the number of the 
“relatively fixed” from year to year because the accounting rules also related unchanged. Accrual 
changes that occur, therefore, be regarded as abnormal. This change is the result of use policy (discretion) 
management excessive, and when at the same time management also have a motive to manipulate 
earnings accrual then the change that occurs is considered as a form of earnings manipulation that did by 
the management. 
Earnings Management = TA/REV 
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The average total accruals before non-routine CEO turnover is higher than after the non-routine change 
of CEO. The average value of total accruals for non-routine before the change 64,015 and after the 
change is -49,335. Minimum value before the turn of the non-routine at -978,246 and a maximum value 
of 1.619,000, while the value of non-routine minimum after the turn of -302,673 and to a maximum of 
257,000. Negative accruals derived from the increasing changes in current liabilities and the amount of 
depreciation thus, the ratio of the change in current assets is smaller than the change in current liabilities. 
The amount of change in current liabilities arises due to the result of the purchase of goods for investment 
in the short term which would increase the value of current assets. Current liabilities also arise as a result 
of the recognition of the number of loads increases to minimize earnings. Negative accruals are also 
sourced from the depreciation expense is so large compared to changes in long-term debt presented in 
current liabilities. 
In the period after the management changes because of the feud (non-recurring) new management has the 
potential of big bath accounting practices, seen from the ratio of the total accrual to the company’s sales 
in the many negatives. Of the 14 samples taken firm, 11 companies have shown average value average of 
-0.070. With a maximum value of -0.002, PT TIFICO Fiber Indonesia, Tbk and minimum -0.182 PT 
Argo Pantes, Tbk. Then the average total accruals after the turn also look minus Rp49 billion. While the 
three companies that do not have negative values, namely PT Toba Pulp Lestari Tbk, and PT. Alam 
Karya Unggul Tbk, which has total assets on average the smallest among the sample of about Rp49 
billion, and PT Astra International, Tbk, which made the turn because its CEO dies. Regarding the 
analysis, the author can be told that this has been done in the first year of management wanted to show a 
poor performance for the performance in subsequent years look better and earnings management 
techniques used is by lower the earnings through the recognition of the increasing burdens. 
In the period before the management changes because of the feud (non-routine), the old management did 
not have the potential to make a big bath accounting practice. The table above shows that of the 14 
companies there are no companies that potentially dominant big bath accounting practices. One of them 
turns because there is CEO who died as PT Astra International Tbk. However, in Total Accrual before the 
turn of the non-routine average of positive Rp 64 billion greater than after the turn of the average minus 
Rp 49 Billion. This means that the larger the company’s management recognizes the component of 
accruals, the higher the potential for earnings management may also have been a factor the company 
carries out the RUPSLB to replace the management who have been earning management by increasing 
profit to make it look good performance to get the bonus. 
The average total accruals before CEO change routine greater than after CEO change routine. The 
average value of total accruals before the turn of the routine of -2,717 and after the turn of -189,931. 
Minimum value before the turn of the routine of -2,883,304 and a maximum value of 3,556,777, while 
the minimum value after a change of routine for -5,248,772 and to a maximum of 1,975,249. 
In the period before the turn of the peaceful management (routine) the old management has the potential 
of big bath accounting practices. Of the 34 samples of the company being taken, 20 companies showed 
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total negative accruals. With an average earnings management of -0.148. The maximum value of -0.001 
on PT Kimia Farma Tbk and minimum -0.974 PT Akasha Wira International Tbk. Then the average total 
before CEO change routine occurred the minimization of profits greater than after the change. Before the 
CEO change routine of -0.066 and after CEO change routine become -0.036 routines. That is in plain 
view was a decline in profit before a change of routine management. According to the authors, this is 
because of the change is done amicably so that the old management hopes that his successor can begin 
the next performance look better with the potential to help the big bath accounting practices at the end of 
his term. 
In the period after the turn of the peaceful management (routine) new management is not potentially big 
bath accounting practices. From the table above that, the new management is doing a potential decline in 
profits through increased burdens but not as big as before the change. Before the change of -0.066 and 
after the change into -0.036. Through each worth minus but the new management continued to show a 
better performance than the previous management. Researchers considered that the new management 
would demonstrate its performance is getting better over time slowly to get the bonus.  
4.1 Hypothesis Testing with Different Test 
 
Table 1. Paired Sample Test 
 N Mean Correlation Sig. 
 
Pair 1 
 
 
Pair 2 
 
Before CEO Change Non-Routine 
After CEO Change Non-Routine 
 
Before CEO Change Routine 
After CEO Change Routine 
 
14 
14 
 
34 
34 
 
.152786 
.517786 
 
-.065588 
-.036176 
 
.878 
 
 
. 075 
 
.000 
 
 
.673 
 
According to the Table 1 above it can be seen that the sample of 14 companies, the average earnings 
management before non-routine CEO turnover amounted to 0.153 with a standard deviation of 0.688 and 
standard error of the mean 0.183. While non-routine after CEO turnover average earnings management 
increased by 0.518 with a standard deviation of 2.122 and standard error of the mean is 0.567. Based on 
these results it appears that the average earnings management before the non-routine change of CEO is 
smaller than after the non-routine change of CEO and both are positive. 
In routine CEO turnover obtained results mean earnings management before the change of -0.066 with a 
standard deviation of 0.236 and standard error of the mean 0.040. Then after a routine CEO turnover 
obtained results mean -0.036 with a standard deviation of 0.193 and standard error of the mean 0.033. 
Based on these results it appears that both earnings management is negative before and after the change 
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of CEO routine. However, after the turn of the CEO routine, the mean of earnings management looks 
better because the negative value was getting smaller than before the change of CEO. 
Results of Paired Samples Correlations table shows how strong and the relationship between pairs of 
variables. Paired Samples Correlations based on the results above it can be seen that the CEO turnover 
nonroutine has a healthy relationship between earnings management before the change of the CEO with 
earnings management after the change of CEO. It can be seen from the correlation of 0.878 and a 
significant level of 0.000. That is real, and there is a healthy relationship between earnings management 
before the non-routine change of CEO with the earnings management after non-routine change of CEO. 
While the results of Paired Samples Correlations on CEO turnover routine there is no substantial 
relationship between earnings management before the change of CEO and earnings management after 
the change of CEO. It can be seen from the weak correlation of 0.075 with a significant level of 0.673. 
This means there is no healthy relationship between earnings management before CEO turnover routine 
with earnings management after CEO turnover routine and not real. 
 
Table 2. Paired Sample Test 
 N Mean T Sig. (2-tailed)
 
Pair 1 
 
 
Pair 2 
 
Before CEO Change Non-Routine 
After CEO Change Non-Routine 
 
Before CEO Change Routine 
After CEO Change Routine 
 
14 
 
 
34 
 
-.3650000
 
 
-.0294118
 
.879 
 
 
-.584 
 
.395 
 
 
.563 
 
Paired Samples Test is used to test whether there are significant differences between the earnings 
management before the change of CEO with after change of CEO both routine and non-routine. From the 
results of Paired Samples Test above Table 2 can be seen that in the event of the non-routine change of 
CEO result of t count -0.879 with 13 degrees of freedom and a level of significance (2-tailed) 0.395. With 
the value of -0.879 t < t table 2.160 then there is no significant difference between the earnings 
management before non-routine change of CEO with the earnings management after non-routine change 
of CEO. Then, from the value of Significance (2-tailed) of 0.395 means that it is greater than 0.05 it 
indicates that Ho is acceptable so that it can be concluded that there was no significant difference 
between the earnings management before non-routine change of CEO with the earnings management 
after non-routine change of CEO. 
Then from the Paired Samples Test above can be seen that in the event of the change of CEO routinely 
result of t count -0.584 with 33 degrees of freedom and a level of significance (2-tailed) 0.563. With the 
value of -0.584 t < t table 2.035 so that there is no significant difference between earnings management 
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before CEO turnover routine with earnings management after CEO turnover routine. Then, from the 
value of significance (2-tailed) of 0.563 and this is greater than 0.05, it indicates that Ho is acceptable so 
that it can be concluded that there was no significant difference between earnings management before 
CEO turnover routine with earnings management after CEO turnover routine. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Based on the calculation above, it can be concluded that there is potential for earnings management of big 
bath accounting model around the change of the CEO, but there was no significant difference between 
earnings management of big bath accounting model before the change of the CEO with earnings 
management of big bath accounting model after change of the CEO both conducted routinely and 
non-routine. 
 
6. Suggestion 
Furthermore, in this study showed a potential means most likely to occur, especially at the turn of the 
CEO of non-routine, but less strong evidence found in this study probably due to the different 
characteristics of each company as well as the condition of the succession is not the same so that it 
reflects conditions general economic differently. Then that becomes the other reason is the limited 
sample of companies lacking a lot due to the events of CEO turnover is not many done by the company in 
the period of observation and limited to manufacturing companies. The result is expected to be a 
reference for further research, especially to reveal better their potential earnings management practices 
focus on change of CEO non-routine by extending the scope of the study sample area that is not only 
limited to the manufacturing company. 
 
References 
Ahmed, A. S., & Duellman, S. (2007). Accounting conservatism and board of director characteristics: An 
empirical analysis. Journal of accounting and economics, 43(2-3), 411-437. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.01.005 
Baldwin, B. A., Ingram, R. W., & Albright, T. L. (2007). Financial Accounting Information for 
Decisions. Thomson Learning. 
Beattie, V., Brown, S., Ewers, D., John, B., Manson, S., Thomas, D., & Turner, M. (1994). Extraordinary 
items and income smoothing: A positive accounting approach. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 21(6), 791-811. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.1994.tb00349.x 
Bhandari, S. B., & Iyer, R. (2013). Predicting business failure using cash flow statement based measures. 
Managerial Finance, 39(7), 667-676. https://doi.org/10.1108/03074351311323455 
Cheng, Q., & Warfield, T. D. (2005). Equity incentives and earnings management. The accounting 
review, 80(2), 441-476. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2005.80.2.441 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ijafs        International Journal of Accounting and Finance Studies           Vol. 1, No. 2, 2018 
214 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
Christensen, T. E., Paik, G. H., & Stice, E. K. (2008). Creating a bigger bath using the deferred tax 
valuation allowance. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 35(5‐6), 601-625. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2008.02092.x 
Dechow, P. M., & Dichev, I. D. (2002). The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual 
estimation errors. The accounting review, 77(s-1), 35-59. 
https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2002.77.s-1.35 
Healy, P. M., & Wahlen, J. M. (1999). A review of the earnings management literature and its 
implications for standard setting. Accounting horizons, 13(4), 365-383. 
https://doi.org/10.2308/acch.1999.13.4.365 
Hwang, L., & Ryan, S. (2000). The Varied Nature and Pricing Implications of Discretionary Behavior: 
Big Baths, Loss Avoidance, and Sugarbowling. Working Paper, City University of New York. 
Jones, J. J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of accounting 
research, 193-228. https://doi.org/10.2307/2491047 
Kothari, S. P. (2001). Capital markets research in accounting. Journal of accounting and economics, 
31(1-3), 105-231. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00030-1 
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. D. (2003). Earnings management and investor protection: An 
international comparison. Journal of financial economics, 69(3), 505-527. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00121-1 
Murphy, K. J., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1993). Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 16(1-3), 273-315. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(93)90014-7 
Nelson, M. W., Elliott, J. A., & Tarpley, R. L. (2002). Evidence from auditors about managers’ and 
auditors’ earnings management decisions. The accounting review, 77(s-1), 175-202. 
https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2002.77.s-1.175 
Nugroho, L., Nurrohmah, S., & Anasta, L. (2018). FAKTOR-FAKTOR YANG MEMPENGARUHI 
OPINI AUDIT GOING CONCERN. Journal Sistem Informasi, Keuangan, Auditing & Perpajakan, 
2(2), 96-111. 
Obinata, T. (2007). Advanced Financial Accounting. 
Otomasa, S. (1997). Real discretion as income-decreasing behavior in the Japanese company. KAIKEI 
(ACCOUNTING), 151(4), 533-544. 
Peasnell, K. V., Pope, P. F., & Young, S. (2005). Board monitoring and earnings management: Do 
outside directors influence abnormal accruals? Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 32(7‐8), 
1311-1346. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0306-686X.2005.00630.x 
Pourciau, S. (1993). Earnings management and nonroutine executive changes. Journal of accounting and 
economics, 16(1-3), 317-336. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(93)90015-8 
Riedl, E. J., & Srinivasan, S. (2010). Signaling firm performance through financial statement 
presentation: An analysis using special items. Contemporary Accounting Research, 27(1), 289-332. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01009.x 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ijafs        International Journal of Accounting and Finance Studies           Vol. 1, No. 2, 2018 
215 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
Schipper, K. (1989). Earnings management. Accounting horizons, 3(4), 91. 
Schroeder, R. G., Clark, M., & Cathey, J. M. (2009). Financial accounting theory and analysis: Text and 
cases (p. 82). John Wiley & Sons. 
Scott, R. W. (2000). Financial accounting theory (2nd ed.). New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Siregar, S. V., & Utama, S. (2008). Type of earnings management and the effect of ownership structure, 
firm size, and corporate-governance practices: Evidence from Indonesia. The international journal 
of accounting, 43(1), 1-27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2008.01.001 
Soekapdjo, S., Nugroho, L., Badawi, A., & Utami, W. (2018). Bad Debt Issues in Islamic Bank: Macro 
and Micro Influencing (Indonesia Cases). International Journal of Commerce and Finance, 4(1), 
10-26. 
Stolowy, H., & Breton, G. (2004). Accounts manipulation: A literature review and proposed conceptual 
framework. Review of Accounting and Finance, 3(1), 5-92. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb043395 
Subramanyam, K. R., & Wild, J. J. (2009). Financial statement analysis. McGraw-Hill. 
Tokuga, Y., & Yamashita, T. (2011). Big bath and management change.  
Utami, W., & Nugroho, L. (2017). Fundamental Versus Technical Analysis of Investment: Case Study of 
Investors Decision in Indonesia Stock Exchange. The Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce, 
1-18. 
Walsh, P., Craig, R., & Clarke, F. (1991). “Big bath accounting” using extraordinary items adjustments: 
Australian empirical evidence. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 18(2), 173-189. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.1991.tb00587.x 
Weisbach, M. S. (1995). CEO turnover and the firm’s investment decisions. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 37(2), 159-188. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(94)00793-Z 
Xie, B., Davidson III, W. N., & DaDalt, P. J. (2003). Earnings management and corporate governance: 
The role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of corporate finance, 9(3), 295-316. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(02)00006-8 
Yamaguchi, T. (2009). Real discretion to meet earnings benchmarks. Annual report of the Economic 
Society, Tohoku University, 69(4), 445-466. 
 
